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INTRODUCTION 
 
In August 2018, the American public became privy to the President’s 
use of an extensive system of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) and 
nondisparagement clauses to prevent campaign staff and White House 
employees from betraying his confidence, leaking information to the press, or 
besmirching––in any way––his administration or family.1 These contracts for 
silence2 were particularly restrictive, even for a man with a fondness for 
management-friendly employment agreements3 and a penchant for “information 
 
1 For a representative NDA with the Trump campaign, see Read: 2016 Trump Campaign 
Nondisclosure Agreement, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/ 
14/politics/trump-campaign-nda-omarosa/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2XL-8JGB]. For a 
representative NDA with a White House official, see Ruth Marcus, Trump Had Senior Staff 
Sign Nondisclosure Agreements. They’re Supposed to Last Beyond His Presidency, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 18, 2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-nondisclosure-
agreements-came-with-him-to-the-white-house/2018/03/18/226f4522-29ee-11e8-
b79df3d931db7f68_story.html?utm_term=.7c03cf0d8ee4 [https://perma.cc/4KKH-W5QH].  
2 Here, I depart from the “contracts of silence” phrasing used most prominently by Arthur 
Garfield in his landmark article on secrecy in contract law. See Arthur Garfield, Promises of 
Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 268 n.17 (1997). 
I do so to underscore the purpose of these agreements––to chill or outright silence speech––
and to achieve that end through restrictive, sometimes absurdly large penalties. This 
Comment is also distinguishable in that I devote more time to grappling with, and potentially 
resolving, First Amendment arguments against enforcing contracts for silence. Nevertheless, 
I cite to Garfield’s work throughout this Comment as a precursor to my analysis. 
3 News accounts chronicling President Trump’s extensive use of NDAs and other contracts 
for silence are legion. See, e.g., David A. Graham, Donald Trump’s Long History of Paying 
for Silence, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2018/01/donald-trumps-long-history-with-hush-money/550745/ [https://perma.cc/4WDK-
73ZN] (“At various times in the past, Donald Trump has struck deals with women in his life, 
or formerly in his life, exchanging money for silence.”). This includes former employees. 
See, e.g., Julianna Goldman & Laura Strickler, Trump Organization Employees Must Agree 
to Keep Info About Trump Family Secret, CBS EVENING NEWS (July 27, 2017, 7:20 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-organization-new-confidentiality-agreement-employees 
-family-secret/ [https://perma.cc/W9LB-P7E2] (describing the widespread use of NDAs 
within the Trump Organization, President Trump’s family company). He has also used 
contracts for silence to control media exposure surrounding past marriages. See, e.g., Trump 
v. Trump, 582 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1008–09 (App. Div. 1992) (enforcing a nondisclosure 
agreement against now-President Trump’s first wife, Ivana). Importantly for my purposes, 
this penchant for NDAs led President Trump to require presidential campaign and transition 
period staffers—in addition to current White House employees—to sign contracts for 
silence. See Scott Horsley, Sworn to Secrecy: Trump’s History of Using Nondisclosure 
Agreements, NPR (Mar. 19, 2018, 6:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/19/595025070/ 
sworn-to-secrecy-trumps-history-of-using-nondisclosure-agreements [https://perma.cc/CV 
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mischief.”4 For instance, not only did his campaign NDA apply to any piece 
of information then-candidate Trump deemed covered, it also stated that 
campaign employees’ obligation existed in perpetuity.5 A draft of the 
NDA he imposed on White House staff, meanwhile, stipulated a $10 
million penalty for each breach.6 
Of course, wrongdoers have long used contractual spurs to silence 
their accusers in a variety of contexts––from industrial accidents in the 
1990s7 to clergy sex abuse scandals;8 from the #MeToo movement9 to 
Silicon Valley titans with their armies of independent contractors.10 Only 
recently, however, have pundits, legal scholars, and activists alike begun 
considering the legality of these contracts for silence in the context of state 
actors––and most notably those involving the 45th President of the United 
States.11  
 
N8-D58B]. In sum, “President Trump seems . . . to have raised contractually enforced silence 
to an art form.” Burt Neuborne, Limiting the Right to Buy Silence; A Hearer-Centered 
Approach, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 411, 425 (2019). 
4 As Nathan Cortez describes in a recent article, 
[T]he Trump administration has adopted a variety of mischievous 
information policies . . . . many unrelated to each other, that together signal 
a shift away from open government . . . towards more cynical uses of 
government information. Examples include removing certain data from the 
public domain, manipulating data, censoring scientists at various federal 
departments, scrubbing certain terms and topics from federal web sites, 
and using transparency initiatives as a pretext to undermine sound science. 
Nathan Cortez, Information Mischief Under the Trump Administration, 94 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 315, 315–16 (2019). 
5 Read: 2016 Trump Campaign Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 1. 
6 Id.; Marcus, supra note 1. 
7 Barry Siegel, Dilemmas of Settling in Secret: Companies Offer Hefty Sums in Exchange for 
Keeping the Details of Public-Hazard Lawsuits Quiet. Plaintiffs Must Choose Their Own 
Interest or the Public Good, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-
04-05/news/mn-1990_1_public-interest [https://perma.cc/FA8D-2LD5]. 
8 Adam Liptak, Price of Broken Vows of Silence, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/us/price-of-broken-vows-of-silence.html [https:// 
perma.cc/P5FY-8RTH].  
9 Matthews Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on Sexual Harassment 
Claims, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1dc8a8ae-b7e0-11e7-8c12-
5661783e5589 [https://perma.cc/BCE6-5A2B]. 
10 Katie Benner, Abuses Hide in the Silence of Nondisparagement Agreements, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/technology/silicon-valley-sexual-
harassment-non-disparagement-agreements.html [https://perma.cc/9T42-G65Y].  
11 This is as good a time as ever to disclaim that this Comment only contemplates contracts 
for silence entered into by federal officials, not state or local government actors. I will not 
devote any time to exploring the use of similar agreements by cities and municipalities in 
settlements they reach with private citizens. Whether and how these officials ought to be able 
to chill citizen speech is a topic for a different paper.  
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Historically, courts have been extremely deferential to government 
entities that restrict employees’ speech when the integrity of sensitive data 
is at stake.12 Debate is therefore liveliest around whether and when 
government actors can quell public employees’ disclosures of 
nonclassified information learned on the job.13  
But the question of how to treat government contracts for silence 
extends far beyond the Beltway’s bipartisan cottage industry of political 
“tell-alls”.14 For instance, contracts for silence potentially implicate 
questions of federal labor law and may be in tension with federal statutes 
put in place to protect government whistleblowers. Moreover, contracts for 
silence are fraught with political accountability concerns. Imagine, for 
example, the uniquely corrosive effect of an elected official enforcing a 
contract for silence against a former employee and current constituent.  
To be sure, many share a common-sense intuition that the government 
should not be able to unduly infringe upon individual citizens’ abilities to engage 
 
12 See, e.g., Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n v. Garfunkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989) (allowing the 
government to protect classified information through contractual relationships with federal 
employees privy to sensitive information). Courts have also held that the government cannot 
restrict former employees from disclosing unclassified information in written form (i.e. 
in “tell-all” memoirs). McGhee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972). 
13 See, e.g., Esha Bhandari, No, the President Can’t Legally Gag White House Staffers, 
ACLU (Mar. 20, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/employee-speech-
and-whistleblowers/no-president-cant-legally-gag-white-house [https://perma.cc/VT26-
4WER] (discussing how the Trump Administration’s broad use of nondisclosure agreements 
should be held unenforceable because “the First Amendment protects federal employees’ 
right to speak in a private capacity about matters of public concern––and certainly the 
functioning of a presidential administration raises many issues that are of public concern”).  
14 See Douglas Martin, W. Marvin Watson, Johnson’s Unofficial Chief of Staff, Dies at 93, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/obituaries/w-marvin-
watson-johnsons-unofficial-chief-of-staff-dies-at-93.html [https://perma.cc/ZDM5-4CBD] 
(contextualizing Watson’s memoir on the Johnson Administration); see also Concepción De 
León, Is Everyone in Politics Writing a Tell-All? Yes, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/books/review/political-books-announced.html 
[https://perma.cc/WST2-UMND] (providing an overview of then-forthcoming political 
memoirs recounting life in the Obama Administration and during the 2016 presidential 
election campaign); David Klinghoffer, A Speechifier in Her Own Write: What I Saw at the 
Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era by Peggy Noonan, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1990), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-02-04/books/bk-87_1_peggy-noonan [https://perma.cc/Y3CD- 
D5ZY] (discussing the memoir of a controversial Reagan-era speechwriter); Morton 
Knodracke, How to Lose Friends and Influence, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 1988), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/29/books/how-to-lose-friends-and-influence.html 
[https://perma.cc/5JFC-DDBT] (reviewing a fiery memoir penned by President Reagan’s 
former chief of staff). 
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in public debate.15 An editor at The Washington Post has gone so far as to deem 
the current administration’s runaway use of contracts for silence “constitutionally 
repugnant.”16 But, as far as I can tell, none of these hit pieces have carefully 
catalogued the legal arguments available to two categories of potential 
plaintiffs: (1) current or former Trump Administration officials facing 
lawsuits for sharing nonclassified information in violation of their NDAs; as 
well as (2) former private sector or campaign staff of then-candidate Trump 
who face lawsuits from the President for allegedly violating contracts for 
silence they entered into before he became Chief Executive.  
This Comment takes up this challenge. Rather than articulating and 
defending a singular argument against the use of contracts for silence by 
state actors, it suggests a menu of approaches––ranging from the 
conventional to the more creative––for challenging these agreements. 
Taking my cue from the pleadings of former executive branch and campaign 
staffers challenging Trump’s NDAs and nondisparagement clauses, this 
Comment explores both contract law and First Amendment grounds for 
dismantling contracts for silence by state actors.17  
In Part I, I describe the fundamental changes to contract law and the 
practice of contracting which provide the backdrop for my discussions of 
contracts for silence. In Part II, I provide the contract law argument for 
invalidating contracts for silence by state actors, and in Part III, I provide its 
foil: the First Amendment argument for declaring such agreements 
unenforceable. I end each Part by contextualizing contracts for silence 
within broader discussions around the value of transparency, public 
access, and the importance of democratic self-governance.  
Of course, both forks of this analysis deserve more extensive 
treatment; this Comment seeks only to make future efforts more effective and 
complete by outlining at least some of the potential paths forward. My hope 
is that, in doing so, I provide scaffolding for the arguments of future 
 
15 Alison Frankel, Trump NDAs Can’t Silence Ex-White House Officials: Legal Experts, 
REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2018, 5:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-nda/trump-ndas-
cant-silence-ex-white-house-officials-legal-experts-idUSKBN1GV2UT [https://perma.cc/ 
4S55-2WPJ]; Jessica Levinson, Can Trump Use NDAs to Prevent White House Staffers 
Like Omarosa from Criticizing Him?, NBC (Aug. 14, 2018, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/can-trump-use-ndas-stop-white-house-staffers-oma 
rosa-criticizing-ncna900706 [https://perma.cc/343A-FAVC]; Bradley P. Moss, Why the White 
House Can’t Stop Omarosa Manigault-Newman from Talking, LAWFARE (Aug. 14, 2018, 12:19 
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-white-house-cant-stop-omarosa-manigault-newman- 
talking [https://perma.cc/DHC3-73A2]. 
16 Marcus, supra note 1.  
17 See, e.g., Complaint at 3–5, Sims v. Trump, No. 1:19-cv-00345 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2019) 
(advancing First Amendment arguments against the enforcement of an NDA against former 
Trump communications adviser Cliff Sims). 
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advocates who share in the belief that “the censorial power is in the people 
over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.”18  
 
I. CONTRACTS FOR SILENCE IN CONTEXT 
 
The nature of contract law is changing. More and more contracts19 
take the form of standard-form, boilerplate agreements which no one reads 
and which no one sues upon.20 Plus, contracting seldom takes the form of 
boisterous, extensive negotiations; more often than not, the employment and 
consumer agreements most people interact with on a daily basis are not 
bargained for.21 This raises concerns for those of us interested in what contract 
law has to say about the enforceability of contracts for silence. To understand 
the stakes of this discussion, I will first explain several contract law topics which 
bear on the issue I have identified, and which set the stage for both the contract 
law and First Amendment arguments against state-actor enforcement of 
contracts for silence against individuals: (1) the privatization of litigation; (2) the 
explosion of arbitration as a form of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
in recent years; and (3) the ongoing battle to protect whistleblowers as 
potentially in tension with the underlying purpose of contracts for silence. 
First, “litigation” is increasingly a private affair––conducted in 
conference rooms before arbiters or rendered unnecessary by parties 
motivated to settle early, which explains why, “even as filings have 
increased, the percentages of cases going to trial (and the absolute number 
 
18 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (citing 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794)). 
19 For the purposes of this Comment, I refer to settlements as falling under the larger umbrella 
of contracts since “American law treats the settlement agreement as a member of the larger 
family of private contracts.” Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the 
Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 9 (1996); see also Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General 
Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 478, 513 (1981) (“Settlements, even when reached 
during a trial, are regarded as private contracts and interpreted according to contract rules.”). 
20 See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard 
Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 120 (2017) (questioning the value of boilerplate language 
in a world where almost “no one reads their form contracts”).  
21 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2014) (charting the rise of standard-form contracts 
containing boilerplate language and explaining the ways boilerplate contracts disempower 
individual consumers or signatories and potentially undermine democratic norms). What’s 
more, standard form agreements have become normalized not only in conventional consumer 
agreements but even in business dealings among substantially more sophisticated parties. 
See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2006) 
(“Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to craft comprehensive and 
detailed, but also particularized, contacts, such parties will commonly conclude agreements 
comprised heavily of traditional terms––contracting norms of a sort––rather than terms 
tailored to the distinct features of their particular bargain.”). 
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of trials) have declined.”22 That the public is less able or unable to monitor 
these proceedings or to read about their resolution ex post poses potential 
harms to our democratic order (e.g. “how can justice in secret ever be 
just?”).23 And while the trend towards more ADR and fewer public trials 
shows no sign of abating, policymakers and judges do have the tools to 
intervene and mitigate transparency concerns.24 Some would have them 
pick up those tools and act quickly to defend the preeminence of public 
trials and oppose the normalization of pretrial settlements as violative of 
our democratic norms of publicity and public access.25  
Second, the ubiquity of mandatory arbitration clauses has similarly 
prevented evidence of disputes from becoming public, even after 
resolution.26 These clauses require that parties to a contract bring any 
claims to private arbitrators rather than in open court; they also sometimes 
include prohibitions on class action suits.27 Researchers “estimat[e] that 
 
22 Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 773–74 (2008). 
23 See id. at 804 (“Open court proceedings enable people to watch, debate, develop, contest, 
and materialize the exercise of both public and private power.”). 
24 As Resnik explains,  
[E]ven as judges and other dispute resolution providers move away from 
trials and focus on pretrial management and dispute resolution in chambers 
and conference rooms, it is possible to build in a place for the public 
(‘sunshine,’ to borrow the term legislators have used) or to wall off 
proceedings from the public. 
Id. at 809.  
25 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (“I do not believe that 
settlement as a generic practice is preferable to judgement or should be institutionalized on a 
wholesale and indiscriminate basis . . . . Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the 
conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor praised.”). A decade after 
Fiss’s landmark––and controversial––piece, David Luban revisited Against Settlement but left 
intact much of its underlying foundation. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the 
Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2620 (1995) (arguing that instead of being “for or against 
settlement,” judges should only approve settlements when doing so serves judicial efficiency 
as well as societal interests in “openness, legal justice, and the creation of public goods”); cf. 
Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and the Public Access to the Courts, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 428, 431 (1991) (“If public access assumes an importance on a par with the 
[judicial] system’s concern for resolving disputes among the litigants, the traditional balance 
would be upset and the courts diverted from their primary mission.”).  
26 See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) (explaining the 
impacts of this privatization––ranging from the slower pace at which judges are now producing 
law to the power citizens are collectively ceding to arbitration groups at the expense of courts). 
27 For a general overview of mandatory arbitration clauses, which The New York Times has 
described as part “of a far-reaching power play orchestrated by American corporations,” see 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Beware the Fine Print: Part I: Arbitration 
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roughly 20% of the non-unionized American workforce is covered by 
mandatory arbitration provisions, and this number may well increase.”28 
Plus, many major service providers also require their customers to consent 
to mandatory arbitration provisions as a condition of their consumer 
agreements.29 By severely restricting the ways consumers and workers seek 
judicial relief for wrongs they have suffered, the movement towards 
mandatory arbitration clauses is increasingly “disarm[ing]” individuals 
seeking justice30 and providing procedural leverage to large, sophisticated 
corporate parties.31 The Supreme Court has proven an engaged partner in 
this movement, too––taking every opportunity to expand the prevalence of 
mandatory arbitration clauses and rejecting, several times, the argument 
that mandatory arbitration conceals important information from public 
view.32 
Third, policymakers are only just beginning to grapple with the 
implications of these foundational changes to contract law––as well as the 
growing frequency of NDAs and nondisparagement clauses––on 
whistleblower statutes. Historically, these laws have protected employees 
who come forward to regulators and elected officials to report 
wrongdoing, either in corporate America or within the federal 
government.33 In response to the ubiquity of NDAs, nondisparagement 
 
Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html 
[https://perma.cc/RC3G-9QTS].  
28 Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory 
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1303, 1310 (2015). 
29 These industries include credit cards, cell phone providers, cable and internet providers, 
and banks––among others. PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED ARBITRATION: UNFAIR AND 
EVERYWHERE 1 (2009), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/unfairandeverywhere. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/8NLF-5TVB]. 
30 Sternlight, supra note 28, at 1310. 
31 After all, more often than not control over procedure is as important––if not more 
important—than control over substance. See, e.g., id. at 1309 (“I’ll let you write the substance 
. . . you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time” (citing Regulatory Reform 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law & Governmental Regulations 
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell))). 
32 See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (upholding an arbitration 
clause preventing an employee class-action despite the clause’s apparent tension with employees’ 
rights to “concerted activity” under the NLRA); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 
228, 235 (2013) (holding that an arbitration clause would not be rendered unenforceable merely 
because the cost of pursuing arbitration exceeded the amount available in recovery). 
33 See, e.g., The Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/ [https://perma.cc/6LVZ-AFZ4] (last visited Mar. 12, 
2020) (providing resources to employees on their rights under federal whistleblower statutes 
as well as a brief overview of whistleblower protections). 
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provisions, and other contracts for silence, Congress saw fit in 2012 to 
pass the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), which 
prohibits agencies from enforcing “any nondisclosure policy, form, or 
agreement” that did not specifically include a savings clause ensuring 
continuity of whistleblower protections. In theory, the WPEA was a win 
for whistleblower advocates on the Hill.34 It reinforced federal 
whistleblower protections in an age of speech-restrictive, standard-form 
contracts and signaled to the rank-and-file of the federal workforce that 
their right to come forward with evidence of fraud and abuse remained 
protected. We have reason to worry about compliance with the WPEA, 
though. Inspectors General within the Trump Administration, including at 
both the Department of Homeland Security and General Services 
Administration, have identified instances of agency shortcomings under 
the WPEA.35 Plus, not all information that the public might have an 
interest in hearing would be covered under even the most stringent 
whistleblower law. While the exact consequences of these shifts in the 
nature of contract law have yet to be seen, the changes to the very nature 
 
34 A perhaps unexpected ally of federal whistleblowers on the Hill––and co-author of the 
WPEA––has been Senator Chuck Grassley, former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. See Ben Kostyack, Senator Grassley Reminds FBI Agents of Their 
Whistleblower Rights, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2018/05/articles/government-whistleblowers/senator-
grassley-reminds-fbi-agents-of-their-whistleblower-rights/ [https://perma.cc/NZQ4-PECL]. 
In a 2018 speech delivered on National Whistleblower Appreciation Day, Senator Grassley 
extolled the virtues of whistleblowers––reminding his audience of the time-honored tradition 
of whistleblower protections dating back to the American Revolution and emphasizing that 
whistleblowers consistently prevent fraud more effectively than relying solely on the 
government to self-regulate. See Senator Chuck Grassley, Speech on National Whistleblower 
Appreciation Day (July 30, 2018), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/ 
grassley-whistleblowers-deserve-our-profound-gratitude [https://perma.cc/T7BC-GLDT]. 
Apart from Senator Grassley, congressional action in defense of whistleblowers has been 
limited to a stalled legislative proposal offering protection to federal whistleblowers who 
come forward in spite of NDAs. No Disrupting Accountability (NDA) Act, H.R. 1484, 
116th Cong. (2019). The late Rep. Elijah Cummings also issued a threat to withhold pay 
from “White House officials who enforce nondisclosure agreements that lack protections 
for federal whistleblowers.” Cristina Marcos, Cummings Threatens Salaries of Trump 
Officials Who Enforce Nondisclosure Agreements, HILL (May 14, 2019, 12:59 PM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/443616-cummings-threatens-salaries-of-trump-
officials-who-enforce-nondisclosure [https://perma.cc/9LS5-DXAK].  
35 See Joe Davidson, Trump Likes Nondisclosure Agreements, but Should Federal Agencies 
Use Secrecy Pacts?, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2018/08/21/trump-likes-nondisclosure-agreements-should-federal-agencies-use-
secrecy-pacts/?utm_term=.3f433d5e4d51 [https://perma.cc/TV3N-LFL7] (describing the 
failure of the DHS to include a required statement in all NDAs regarding the employee’s 
rights and obligations concerning certain disclosures).  
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of our legal agreements (including their forums and formats) are 
important. While the following Parts touch on the topics raised here, they 
do not propose resolutions to these ongoing debates; instead, they focus 
on potential paths through the uncertain thicket that is the future of 
contract law. 
 
II. THE CONTRACT LAW ARGUMENT 
 
Invalidating contracts for silence necessarily undermines the time-
honored tradition of respecting contracting parties’ wishes, opening up a 
variety of doctrinal unknowns.36 Indeed, freedom of contract is a foundational, 
though not unquestioned, element of American law.37 To be sure, courts have 
had no problem overriding parties’ wishes when substantial societal interests 
are at risk. For example, contracts for silence which suppress evidence38 or 
conceal crimes39 are routinely invalidated. Courts have also struck down 
particularly restrictive contracts for silence when they violate the terms of 
statutes40 or where courts have expressed and consistently applied public 
policies against particular contractual practices.41 At the most basic level, 
 
36 See M.P. Furmston, The Analysis of Illegal Contracts, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 267, 293 (1966) 
(“One of the most interesting unresolved points is the extent to which one can sell one’s silence.”). 
37 Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 610-11 (1936) (“[F]reedom of contract is the 
general rule and restraint the exception.”); cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379, 392–93 (1937) (holding that freedom of contract is not an absolute right and may 
be restricted when in the public interest). 
38 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 554 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). The First Restatement 
takes a harder line than the Second Restatement, which turned away from articulating specific 
grounds for unenforceability and established a balancing test for finding contracts potentially 
unenforceable on public policy grounds. Compare id. (“A bargain that has for its object or 
consideration the suppression of evidence by inducing witnesses to leave the State, by the 
destruction of documents, or otherwise, is illegal.”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (laying out factors which weigh in favor and against 
enforcement of a contract term).  
39 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 39, §548; see also Garfield, supra note 
2, at 306–12 (explaining the application of the Second Restatement’s balancing test in the 
context of contracts to conceal crimes). 
40 See, e.g., Hobson Bearing Int’l, 365 N.L.R.B. 73 (2017) (invalidating relevant portions of 
a confidentiality agreement that violated the National Labor Relations Act’s protections for 
workers, including by “prohibiting employees from discussing their pay and/or bonuses” and 
subjecting them to liquidated damages provisions if they breached). 
41 For example, “the Eleventh Circui[t] [has a] long-standing approach that settlements in 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) litigation should not involve confidentiality because it 
contravenes congressional intent behind the law and undermines regulatory efforts and that 
FLSA settlement agreements must be filed in the court’s public docket.” Ronald L. Burdge, 
Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements is Bad for Clients, Bad for Lawyers, Bad for 
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“[t]he fact that people can use contracts [for] silence to keep important 
information from reaching the public explains why lawmakers should want to 
regulate these contracts.”42 But the fact remains that, more often than not, 
courts are reluctant to disturb a bargained-for agreement. Therefore, it is critical 
to begin this Part by acknowledging that invalidating contracts for silence 
involves swimming upstream. Nevertheless, in this Part, I identify and evaluate 
the strongest contract law arguments against contracts for silence, focusing 
primarily on how to best assert public policy defenses to enforcement. 
Parties agree to contracts for silence in a variety of contexts. 
Sometimes, parties are motivated to enter into contracts for silence by 
economic interests43––including worries that, should a particular piece of 
information become public, another party to the agreement would suffer 
financial consequences.44 Parties also contract for silence in the context of 
settlement agreements designed to insulate a tortfeasor from civil liability 
by “hushing” the party who could stand to gain by making that information 
public.45 Both varieties of contracts for silence46 have generally been 
 
Justice, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012privacyandconfidentiality/conf
identiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_justice/ [https://perma.cc/483B-
MGR4] (citations omitted). Other courts have also invalidated confidentiality provisions in 
court-reviewed FLSA settlements as contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Lopez v. Nights of 
Cabiria, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (invalidating confidentiality provisions 
of an employment agreement as “in strong tension with the remedial purposes of the FLSA”). 
42 Garfield, supra note 2, at 275. 
43 See id. at 266 (“[C]ontracts [for] silence have also long been used in commercial circles to 
protect companies from the disclosure of valuable economic information such as trade secrets.”). 
44 Id. at 269. While this example invites readers to think about corporate and individual tort 
victims, contracts for silence are also de rigeur in the context of trade secret protection. For more, 
see ARTHUR H. SEIDEL & DAVID R. CRICHTON, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD 
KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS 12 (3d ed. 1995) (“A trade secret 
is misappropriated only when there is a wrongful taking, use, or disclosure of another’s trade secret. 
Generally, a wrongful taking, use, or disclosure arises from a breach of a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship or a violation of the norms of business conduct through theft or espionage.”).  
45 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 25, at 2650 (“Among the products whose defects are alleged to 
have been hidden by protective orders or sealed settlements are Dow Corning’s silicone gel breast 
implants; pickup trucks made by Ford and General Motors; Upjohn’s sleeping pill Halcion; 
Pfizer’s Bjork-Shiley heart valves; and McNeil Pharmaceutical’s painkiller, Zomax.”). 
46 The examples contained in this paragraph provide sufficient background on the scope and  
use of contracts for silence. Other uses are, of course, possible. For instance, contracts for  
silence can be incorporated into agreements protecting the reputation of celebrities in 
prenuptial agreements or protecting secret sources in journalism. See generally Garfield, 
supra note 2, at 272 (explaining how such agreements can “protect privacy and 
reputational interests”); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) 
(dealing with a journalist’s source for inside political information who insisted upon 
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considered win–win solutions for the parties involved.47 
To be valid contracts, these agreements have to meet certain threshold 
requirements––for instance, the agreements must constitute bargained-for 
exchanges48 between at least two parties, supported by consideration.49 Well-
lawyered parties likely will not have trouble satisfying this contract formation 
requirement or showing that the agreement resulted from a valid offer and 
acceptance of the contract terms.50 While courts may sometimes invalidate 
contracts between private parties for fear that a reasonable person would not 
have intended the agreement to have legal force, such a ruling is harder to 
imagine in the context of an agreement where one party is a state actor.51 Who 
would imagine a contract with a government actor not to be binding, after 
all? Indefiniteness of contract terms might provide another route for courts to 
invalidate a contract for silence, though such an approach might require 
creative decision-making on the part of judges.52 
A substantive doctrine of contract law that may provide some 
assistance here is unconscionability.53 “Unconscionability has generally 
been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of 
one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”54 As a doctrine, unconscionability is perhaps 
most relevant to adhesion contracts, i.e., “form contract[s] provided by a 
 
confidentiality protections enshrined in contract); Huggins v. Povich, No. 131164/94, 
1996 WL 515498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 19 1996) (addressing litigation concerns related 
to such a celebrity postnuptial agreement). 
47 Cf. Garfield, supra note 2, at 266 (describing why this system is untenable in certain situations 
where public access to that information is critically important for one reason or another). 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
49 See generally id. §§ 71–94 (explaining the contractual requirement of consideration). 
50 “Problems of contract formation are more common when contracts [for] silence are created 
informally, particularly if they are oral.” Garfield, supra note 2, at 277. 
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 48, § 21 cmt. c (“In some 
situations the normal understanding is that no legal obligation arises . . . .”). 
52 I say this because the sophisticated parties drafting contracts for silence are probably 
unlikely to leave the meaning of key contract terms ambiguous, which would force 
courts to construe such terms extremely narrowly and make the task of invalidating 
the contract more difficult. However, courts would find support for this task in the 
Restatement—which urges courts to construe contract terms in the light most favorable 
to the public interest. See id. § 207 (“In choosing among reasonable meanings of a promise or 
agreement[,] . . . a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.”).  
53 Garfield describes one additional approach which I do not explore here: the construction 
of § 557 of the First Restatement of Contracts, which he contends could rehabilitate the 
notion “that parties should not use contracts to suppress information of public interest.” 
Garfield, supra note 2, at 287. Since § 557 has only been referenced twice in judicial 
decisions since 1932, I see it as unlikely to offer meaningful support. Id. at 288. 
54 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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party with significantly greater bargaining power” than another.55 Yet, 
unconscionability may not be as suited doctrinally to policing contracts 
for silence since it focuses exclusively on the parties to the agreement and 
not on the costs borne by third-parties. Since contracts for silence are most 
problematic when they chill speech that might otherwise invigorate public 
debate, unconscionability doesn’t feel like the right doctrinal hook for this 
argument: applying it to the facts of a conventional contracts for silence 
case would involve fitting a square peg into a round hole, so to speak. 
A more appropriate doctrinal hook for this argument is the public policy 
doctrine, which operates as a defense to the enforcement of contracts rather than 
as an ex ante bar on contracting. The doctrine boils down to the truism that, 
“[w]hile freedom of contract might exist, there is no freedom to use contracts to 
undermine important societal values.”56 A public policy defense is available to 
parties in litigation when “the interest in [a term’s] enforcement is clearly 
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of 
such terms.”57 Courts routinely look to duly enacted legislation as manifestations 
of a jurisdiction’s public policy judgments, though most of the time, as with 
contracts for silence implicating free speech values, there is no legislation on 
point.58 While this balancing test for enforcing a public policy test seems intuitive, 
it in fact “masks the difficulties that courts encounter in trying to apply it.”59 And 
balancing test aside, the bar remains quite high.60  
 
A. Public Policy as a Defense to Enforcement 
 
Arguing for a public policy defense against enforcing for silence 
poses unique challenges and opportunities. Unfortunately, studying the 
impact of contracts for silence on the parties involved is made more difficult 
by the fact that most are never the subject of litigation or, if they are, involve 
sealed settlement agreements. On one hand, the strongest data-driven 
arguments for invoking the public policy defense to enforcement are likely 
case- and fact-specific.61 On the other hand, contracts for silence by state 
 
55 Garfield, supra note 2, at 285. 
56 Id. at 294.  
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 48, § 178. 
58 Id. § 178, cmt. a. 
59 Garfield, supra note 2, at 314.  
60 For instance, in Pennsylvania, “[a] contract, to be against public policy, must have a tendency 
to injure the public or to be against the public good, or must be inconsistent with good morals as 
to the consideration or the thing to be done.” In re Book’s Estate, 147 A. 608, 609 (Pa. 1929). 
61 A couple of hypothetical cases serve to illustrate this point. What about the cases of tort 
plaintiffs who expose government wrongdoing, especially with regard to construction or 
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actors implicate hotly contested questions of whether and how parties should 
be allowed to settle62 and whether, at an abstract level, “silence [is] something 
that a party should be able to trade lawfully in a contract exchange . . . .”63 
That the rights protected by the First Amendment “are arguably so 
fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society” is also a strong 
argument in favor of such a public policy defense.64 Plus, the fact that a well-
functioning array of existing statutes controls the flow of information related 
to national security suggests that contracts for silence may be overkill––or at 
the very least created with motives other than safeguarding military 
interests.65 In the following Sections, I sketch potential avenues for motivated 
parties to explore when launching their own challenges to contracts for 
silence, grounded in the public policy doctrine.66 
 
B. Public Policy & Case Law 
 
 The public policy interests embodied in the landmark New York Times 
v. Sullivan case lend some context to this worry that silencing––or chilling—
criticism of public officials undermines the purpose of the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause. Indeed, the Court relied on first principles in that 1964 
case to hold that public officials could not bring libel suits against private 
 
other services where the hazard could harm others (i.e. faulty bridge work)? And what about 
patterns of sexual harassment by public employees directed at members of the public and 
concealed by contracts for silence? 
62 Compare Fiss, supra note 25, at 1076, and Luban, supra note 25, at 2621, with Miller, 
supra note 25, at 464. 
63 Garfield, supra note 2, at 294. 
64 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 516 (1993). 
65 For instance, The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552 (2018); Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §1 (2018); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. §552b(b) 
(2018); Presidential Records Act, 44 U.S.C. §2201–2207 (2018); and the Federal Records Act, 
44 U.S.C. §3101–3107 (2018). In addition, for an example of how the Obama Administration 
envisioned government transparency functioning, see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 
13526 (Dec. 29, 2009) (establishing a framework for the governance of sensitive government 
information––including declassification––on the grounds that, “[o]ur democratic principles 
require that the American people be informed of the activities of their Government”). 
66 Accord Garfield, supra note 2, at 266 (recommending that “courts deny enforcement to 
[contracts of silence] when the public interest in access to the suppressed information 
outweighs any legitimate interest in contract enforcement”). For another thoughtful analysis 
of the public policy doctrine in the context of contracts for silence, see generally David A. 
Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165 (2019) 
(arguing that individuals who sign non-disclosure agreements following incidents of 
sexual misconduct should be able to invoke a public policy defense to the enforcement of 
those agreements against them in court).  
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citizen critics of their official conduct absent a showing of actual malice.67 
For the Sullivan Court, the most important function of the First Amendment 
is to preserve the ability of private citizens to engage in open dialogue about 
issues of public concern, even when that dialogue includes unwelcome (or 
even unfriendly) critiques of public servants.68 While acknowledging the 
trade-offs inherent in such a permissive system, the Court accepted the 
wisdom of the Founders in creating strong free speech protections, writing, 
“The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, ‘presupposes that right 
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than 
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will 
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.’”69 Against this backdrop, the 
abiding focus of the Sullivan Court was that the law could be construed to 
silence citizen speech that was necessary for a robust, full debate on the issues 
the advertisement at issue explored.70 This insight is particularly relevant to 
the question of contemporary contracts for silence.  
Constitutional law and politics scholar Mark Graber concurs. He takes 
the approach that “the public policy exception in contract law” for these 
situations “only makes sense in light of the public policy expressed by the 
First Amendment or the Constitution.”71 Otherwise, “in a dictatorship that 
recognized contract law, the ruling figures would have a right to buy up 
critical or damaging speech.”72 Graber also makes the point that, for the 
holding in Sullivan to mean anything, contracts for silence with public 
officials must be unenforceable: “If the Constitution prohibits state tort laws 
from sanctioning negligently false statements about public officials or 
 
67 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).  
68 See, e.g., id. at 269 (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by 
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle 
of our constitutional system.” (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931))).  
69 Id. at 270 (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
70 For more,  review the Court’s discussion of Justice Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Whitney 
v. California: “Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, [“those who 
won our independence”] eschewed silence coerced by law––the argument of force in its worst 
form.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
71 Mark Graber, Stormy Daniels and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 
17, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/stormy-daniels-and-new-york-times-co-
v.html [https://perma.cc/6WXE-C3QN]; cf. Jack M. Balkin, Stormy Daniels and Cambridge 
Analytica, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 18, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/stormy-
daniels-and-cambridge-analytica.html [https://perma.cc/U2T9-3RYM] (explaining that 
Stormy Daniels’s “best argument sounds in contract law,” not in First Amendment law under 
the void for public policy doctrine espoused by Graber). Balkin’s response is not particularly 
germane to this paper, however, since he spends most of his time thinking about the ability 
of private actors like Facebook to enforce nondisclosure agreements. 
72 Graber, supra note 71. 
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candidates for public office [as it did in Sullivan], then the same First 
Amendment plainly prohibits state contract law from sanctioning true 
statements about public officials and candidates for public office.”73 By that 
logic, we should not allow public officials (and candidates for elected office) 
to contract around the limits Sullivan places on state actors’ abilities to enforce 
state libel law against private citizens.74 
 
C. Public Policy & Administrative Adjudications  
 
As of yet, contracts for silence are an under-litigated topic in federal 
courts. Determinations by administrative law judges are, however, filling the 
gap. In the absence of legislative action, agencies are developing their own 
record, which would support a court in holding such an agreement 
unenforceable on public policy grounds. One such adjudication is Aurore C. 
v. McDonald. In that matter, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) scrutinized a settlement agreement reached between 
the Department of Veterans Affairs and a former nurse in a Seattle, 
Washington care facility.75 First, the EEOC invalidated on public policy 
grounds a provision stipulating that the complainant “[w]aive[d] future and 
unknown disputes in any forum,” reasoning that “[i]t is axiomatic that parties 
can only resolve actual existing disputes.”76 Second, the EEOC eyed the 
agreement’s particularly broad nondisparagement provision, which read: “It 
should be understood that Complainant shall be prohibited from making any 
complaints or negative comments to any member of Congress or their staff, 
or any newspapers or media . . . or any other public forums, about the facts 
of this Settlement Agreement or the facts or conditions that led up to this 
Settlement Agreement.”77 The EEOC held this provision void as “an 
unlawful, overly restrictive confidentiality limitation” that infringed upon 
“her First Amendment rights.”78 The Commission severed these two 
provisions and let the remainder of the agreement stand.79 Aurore suggests 
that at least in some corners, the public’s interest in transparency may 
outweigh an individual party’s interest in silencing inconvenient speech.  
 
 
73 Id.  
74 See id. (“Public officials and candidates for office should no more be able to suppress criticism 
of their behavior through nondisclosure agreements than they are through libel laws.”). 
75 EEOC Decision No. 0120150961, 2016 WL 1622532 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 14, 2016). 
76 Id. at *4–5. 
77 Id. at *2. 
78 Id. at *5. 
79 Id.  
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D. Some Objections 
 
While this argument against the enforcement of contracts for silence 
is doctrinally sound, courts may not find it feasible to implement. For one, 
advocating for the use of public policy defenses to contract enforcement 
necessarily requires drawing a line in the sand and articulating not only the 
public costs of enforcing such an agreement, but also the countervailing 
values which favor voiding it. Any legal doctrine requiring such absolutist 
reasoning invites suggestions that the advocate overstates his case.80 While 
there are significant consequences to the secrecy interests served by contracts 
for silence,81 such critiques are impossible to escape––indeed, they are a 
feature, not a bug, of this area of law. 
Another objection to this approach rests on the alleged ephemeral 
nature of public policy defenses. By this account, public policy as a doctrine 
has no limiting principle, inviting abuse.82 These worries may be overstated, 
though. As David Hoffman and I explained elsewhere, “[p]ublic policy . . . is 
merely a contractual shield, not a sword, and can only be used by those 
internal to the contractual relationship.”83 Other limits further cabin the reach 
of public policy defenses. As opposed to a legislative solution, public policy 
defenses “are adopted by common law courts in a step-wide, slow, and 
accretive manner.”84 The benefits of this approach are clear: “If one court 
goes too far[,] . . . the next court considering such an agreement can choose 
again.”85 Plus, the doctrine has a media-friendly posture; it’s relatively easily 
understood and sends a clear message to the public about the “social meaning 
of [these] legal agreements.”86 
 It is worth adding that advancing this contract law argument against 
the enforceability of contracts for silence would serve yet one additional 
 
80 See 6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1375 (1962) (“The loudest 
and most confident assertions as to what makes for the general welfare and happiness of 
mankind are made by the demagogue and the ignoramus.”). 
81 See, e.g., Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 66, at 198 (2019) (“[S]ecrecy creates a 
unique set of problems when it is attached to the settlement of legal rights that have 
collective attributes.”). 
82 The epitome of this critique is an oft-cited line from a British case, “[Public policy] is a 
very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.” 
Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303.  
83 Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 66, at 200. 
84 Id. at 201–02. 
85 Id. at 202. 
86 Id. at 205. For more on the expressive significance of law, generally, and contract law, 
specifically, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2025 (1996) (exploring the messages communicated by law and the relation of law to 
shifting social mores). 
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interest: that of rehabilitating contract law and letting it speak on matters of 
social, political, and economic importance.87 At the same time, making only 
this contract law argument would foreclose the First Amendment approach 
to contracts for silence, an approach which might resonate at a different and 
deeper level with everyday Americans.88  
 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT LAW ARGUMENT 
 
 The First Amendment dimensions of contracts for silence stem from 
an underlying belief—a civic commitment—that state-sponsored secrecy 
corrupts democratic governments.89 In the context of contracts for silence, 
where parties enter into binding agreements with others to relinquish their 
right to uninhibited speech, this civic commitment is potentially threatened. 
In this Part, I contemplate two genres of legal claims against President Trump 
stemming from his use of contracts for silence: (1) government employees 
facing NDA enforcement actions for disclosing nonclassified information; as 
well as (2) former campaign staff facing enforcement actions initiated by 
current public officials for alleged violations of NDAs that pre-dated their 
government service. In doing so, I locate government contracts for silence 
within First Amendment jurisprudence concerning speech protections available 
to government employees. I further contend that current or former employees 
of the President are more likely to successfully defend against an enforcement 
action if their claims fall into the first category rather than the second.  
 
A. Defenses Available to Current or Former Administration Employees 
 
In this Section, I explore several lines of Supreme Court cases 
supporting public employees’ Free Speech rights. While the Court has 
chipped away at the unrestrained right of government employees to speak on 
 
87 Cf. supra Part I (explaining that contemporary contract law deals far more with arbitration 
provisions and standard-form agreements than these sort of loftier ideals). For more on how 
contracts for silence “hush” contract law itself, see Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 66, 
at 220. 
88 Garfield focused his analyses on contract law arguments to the detriment of his First 
Amendment analysis. Maybe this consideration failed to sway him. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 
2, at 267 (identifying the state action and waiver doctrines as important but unclear considerations 
for those seeking to defend against enforcement actions for contracts for silence).  
89 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Essay in Political Tactics, or Inquiries Concerning the Discipline 
and Mode of Proceeding Proper to Be Observed in Political Assemblies: Principally Applied 
to the Practice of the British Parliament, and to the Constitution and Situation of the 
National Assembly of France, in 2 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 298, 315 (John Bowring 
ed., 1838–43) (“Secresy is an instrument of conspiracy; it ought not, therefore, to be the 
system of a regular government.”).  
Vol. 4:1]                President Trump’s Contracts for Silence 
 
 
 
141 
matters of public importance over the years, this doctrine remains a reliable 
way for employees, in their personal capacities, to engage in civic discussions. 
In the context of contracts for silence, these cases stand for the proposition that 
restrictions on the speech of government employees must bear some relation to 
the positions they occupy; under this doctrine, firing from the hip and silencing 
all government employee speech must be illegal.  
The seminal case in this area of law is Pickering. There, the Court 
came to the defense of an Illinois teacher, fired for publishing a newspaper 
opinion piece opposing a proposed tax increase that his employer, the local 
Board of Education, supported.90 The Board justified its decision to terminate 
the teacher by characterizing his piece as “detrimental to the efficient 
operation and administration of the schools of the district.”91 The Court saw 
things differently, emphasizing that the tax increase was “a matter of 
legitimate public concern” and that “[o]n such a question free and open 
debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate.”92 Especially 
because teachers are “most likely to have informed and definite opinions 
as to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent,” 
the Court held that their voices were particularly valuable to the public 
debate and that they should be permitted to engage in that debate without 
“fear of retaliatory dismissal.”93 
The Court then took the opportunity presented by Pickering’s fact 
pattern to pronounce upon broader First Amendment values. First, the 
Court re-emphasized “[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered 
debate on matters of public importance” as “the core value of the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”94 Second, the Court explained 
that, under recent case law, if the opinion piece in question was penned 
by a private citizen who wasn’t employed by the School District, the 
Board would have no “legal right to sue” the author, absent a showing 
that the statements ran afoul of the standard set out in New York Times v. 
Sullivan.95 Since the teacher had no close working relationship with the 
 
90 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 571–72. 
93 Id. at 572. 
94 Id. at 573. 
95 The standard set out in New York Times v. Sullivan allowed public officials to seek 
recovery from members of the general public who allegedly defamed them only when the 
officials can put on proof that the speech contained “statements . . . shown to have been made 
either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.” Id.  
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Board and didn’t handle tax matters on a day-to-day basis,96 the Court 
read his opinion piece as an attempt to speak as a member of the general 
public on a critical issue, which entitled him to free speech rights.97 
Pickering has come to stand for the proposition that public employees do 
have a constitutional right to speak on matters of public concern without 
fear of retaliation, so long as they don’t make knowingly or recklessly 
false statements.98 
Fifteen years later, in Connick v. Myers, the Court revisited the 
question of how far public employees’ First Amendment rights extend when 
speaking on matters of public concern. Connick dealt with the termination of a 
New Orleans Assistant District Attorney who refused a transfer to another 
section of the District Attorney’s Office and who, in an alleged act of “mini-
insurrection,”99 circulated a workplace questionnaire to colleagues.100 In that 
case, the Court restated the holding of Pickering and emphasized the importance 
of “seek[ing] a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through 
its employees.”101 But unlike the Pickering Court, the majority in Connick 
determined this balancing test benefitted the District Attorney’s Office and not 
petitioner.102 Core to this determination was the Court’s judgment that the 
staffing conditions addressed via petitioner’s questionnaire did not 
constitute “a matter of public concern.”103 For that reason, the local 
government deserved “wide latitude in managing their offices, without 
 
96 Earlier in the opinion, the Court observed that the teacher’s “employment relationships 
with the Board and, to a somewhat lesser extent, with the superintendent are not the kind of 
close working relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty 
and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning.” Id. at 570. The Court alluded to 
that observation when concluding on the extent of petitioner’s First Amendment rights, 
writing that in Pickering, “the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially 
involved in the subject matter of the public communication,” suggesting the rule they laid 
out ought not be read as categorical. Id. at 574. 
97 Id. at 574. 
98 Id. at 574–75. 
99 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983). 
100 Id. at 140-41. The questionnaire sought to gauge employees’ thoughts on a variety of 
subjects, including the “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance 
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to 
work in political campaigns.” Id.  
101 Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
102 Id.  
103 To be fair, the Court conceded that one of petitioner’s questions did seem to touch on a 
matter of public concern (the question concerning political campaigns) but that when 
evaluated holistically, that question did not outweigh the questions which failed to touch 
on public concerns. Id. at 146–47. 
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intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First 
Amendment.”104 Connick can therefore be read as distinguishing Pickering—
especially when a public employee speaks on internal employment 
matters—and triggering a balancing test in all other instances where a 
public interest is potentially implicated.105 
 It took over twenty years for the Court to revisit and amend the 
Connick approach. In a 2006 case, Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court 
substantially cabined the First Amendment rights of public employees as 
recognized in Connick and Pickering, holding that, “when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties,” they “are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes” and no First Amendment rights are 
implicated.106 Aware that some would accuse it of collapsing the Pickering 
framework in on itself, the Court countered by suggesting (perhaps 
implausibly) that public employees did not lose rights because of the holding 
in Garcetti.107 From the majority’s perspective, “[r]efusing to recognize First 
Amendment claims based on government employees’ work product does not 
prevent them from participating in public debate.”108 By this logic, while 
public employees can, of course, engage in public debate as citizens, that does 
not mean they can “perform their jobs however they see fit.”109 After 
Garcetti, therefore, only public employees making statements outside of their 
official duties that touch on matters of public concern are entitled to the 
judicial balancing test under Pickering and its progeny.110 
The Court clarified the first prong of Garcetti’s two-step inquiry in a 
2014 related case, Lane v. Franks.111 There, a public employee, Lane, alleged 
that his former employer retaliated against him for offering testimony in a 
coworker’s public corruption trial by firing him in violation of his First 
Amendment rights.112 The Court was asked to consider “whether the First 
Amendment protects a public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, 
compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities.”113 
At trial, the district court relied on Garcetti to hold that, since “Lane had learned 
of the information that he testified about while working [for the state],” his 
 
104 Id. at 146. 
105 Id. at 140. 
106 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
107 Id. at 422. 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id at 421.  
111 Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014).  
112 Id. at 232-34. 
113 Id. at 231. 
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speech fell within his “official job duties” and was not subject to First 
Amendment protection.114  
In a uniquely straightforward opinion, the Supreme Court rejected 
that analysis, holding that Lane’s speech was not only protected by the First 
Amendment, but also that it was a “quintessential example” of the type of 
speech the Founders envisioned protecting under the Free Speech Clause.115 
To Justice Sotomayor, it mattered that Lane divulged the information in a 
judicial proceeding. She elaborated, writing, “Anyone who testifies in court 
bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth.”116 
Relying on this justification, the Court clarified the Garcetti test, adding that 
the crucial question in such analyses “is whether the speech at issue is itself 
ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely 
concerns those duties.”117 Lane therefore provides a helpful coda to Garcetti 
both by developing the concept of a “matter of public concern” and by 
insisting that the context of speech is relevant to any judicial inquiry under 
the First Amendment.  
 
1. Protections for Public Employee Speech on Matters of            
Public Concern 
 
Determining whether or not public employee speech falls “within the 
protected category of citizen commentary on matters of public concern” 
remains a difficult inquiry, however. Lower court opinions, as well as 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions, help clarify the contours of this 
category but stop short of providing bright-line rules. For the purpose of my 
analysis, these opinions include cases dealing with two aspects of 
government speech: its audience and its content.  
Recent case law has placed some significance on the right of third 
parties to hear what public employees have to say. For instance, in Harman 
v. City of New York, the Second Circuit held that a city agency could not 
require its employees to seek permission before speaking to the press.118 The 
court clarified that the City would have needed to demonstrate “actual harm 
justifying such a broad restriction on the ability of employees to comment on 
the workings of the city agencies” for the regulation to pass muster.119 The 
regulation was struck down, because the City failed to make such a showing 
 
114 Id. at 234–35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
115 Id. at 238. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 240. 
118 Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111 (1998). 
119 Id. at 115.  
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and because restraining public employees’ speech “also imposes a significant 
burden on the public’s right to read and hear what the employees would have 
otherwise written and said”.120 Harman was arguably a narrow ruling, 
however; it turned on the ability of television news viewers to hear what a 
government employee had to say. As the Seventh Circuit clarified in 
Wernsing v. Thompson, the calculus changes, then, when the matters 
concerned are entirely internal to a government workplace.121 
The content of the speech is also critical, particularly when the topic 
of the employee’s speech is related, even indirectly, to the employee’s 
professional obligations. For instance, in Lane, Justice Sotomayor observed 
that the plaintiff’s testimony on the topic of “corruption in a public program 
and misuse of state funds” was “obviously” a matter of public concern and 
that the context of the speech (sworn judicial testimony) bolstered that 
conclusion.122 The Supreme Court has since clarified, however, that the 
threshold for making meaningful citizen commentary on matters of public 
concern is not as low a bar as potentially suggested by Justice Sotomayor. 
For instance, making statements while clothed (either literally in a 
government uniform, or metaphorically) in the indicia of government 
affiliation isn’t enough to trigger protection under the First Amendment.123 
Lower courts have also stepped into the gap and attempted to shore 
up the meaning of “public concern,” sometimes protecting the employee and 
sometimes siding with her employer. For instance, the Ninth Circuit, has held 
as a general principle that “the public’s interest in learning about illegal 
conduct by public officials and other matters at the core of First Amendment 
protection outweighs a state employer’s interest in avoiding a mere potential 
disturbance to the workplace.”124 The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that a police 
regulation preventing officers from discussing any and all elements of a K9 
 
120 Id. at 119 (citation omitted).  
121 See Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 754 (2007) (“Internal communications 
regarding office personnel policies, which allege no malfeasance or wrongdoing, simply 
are not the stuff of protected speech. Accordingly, Wernsing’s inquiry does not constitute 
speech on a matter of public concern.”).  
122 Lane, 573 U.S. at 241. 
123 See generally City of San Diego, Cal., v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004). The Court explained 
that in the context of a police officer who alleged he was fired for First Amendment-protected 
speech in connection with a sexualized eBay store, 
The use of the uniform, the law enforcement reference in the Web site, the 
listing of the speaker as ‘in the field of law enforcement,’ and the debased 
parody of an officer performing indecent acts while in the course of official 
duties brought the mission of the employer and the professional of its 
officers into serious disrepute.  
Id. at 81. 
124 Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted). 
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program with the public violated an officer’s First Amendment rights because 
it was too broad and not narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary disturbance to 
the force.125 
Taken together, these data points suggest that a lawsuit challenging 
the Trump Administration’s contracts for silence with current White House 
employees would stand a good chance of success. For one, the NDAs leaked 
from the White House are extremely broad, covering nearly every utterance 
made by current and former employees. The agreements do not appear to 
discriminate between potential hearers or between different types of 
information (classified v. nonclassified; sensitive v. mundane). Employees 
hushed by the Administration’s contracts for silence likely have the best 
chance of defending enforcement actions if they can paint their public speech 
(or written exposés) as commenting on potential corruption within the 
executive branch. As both Lane and Robinson make clear, public debate over, 
and scrutiny of, government officials’ behavior––their stewardship of the 
collective trust––is of critical public importance. Yet even if public 
corruption were not raised directly in the speech at issue, litigants would have 
strong arguments that the Trump NDAs in their current form impermissibly 
chill citizen speech.  
 
2. Permissible Restrictions on Public Employee Speech Concerning 
National Security 
 
 While “the Government may not generally restrict individuals from 
disclosing information that lawfully comes into their hands in the absence of 
a ‘state interest of the highest order,’”126 it is also the case that “[g]overnment 
officials in sensitive confidential positions may have special duties of 
nondisclosure.”127 In the context of this Comment, these special duties 
complicate the analysis. After all, if governments are able to bind public officials 
to silence––and those employees are the subject of many, if not most, 
contracts for silence––does not that render moot much of this argument? In 
fact, while a handful of government employees are subject to certain speech 
limitations when privy to information relevant to national security, they 
generally constitute a small minority of public officials. What’s more, the record 
contains no apparent examples of government employees in non-intelligence or 
national security offices being held to such exacting silence standards. Charting 
the evolution of caselaw attempting to make sense of these dynamics may help 
clarify the rights of public officials to challenge contracts for silence.  
 
125 See generally Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2017). 
126 United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 605 (1995) (citation omitted).  
127 Id. at 606. 
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 The first such case is Snepp v. United States, where the Court held 
that government employees can be contractually barred from publishing not 
only classified but also nonclassified information without prepublication 
review.128 In that case, the government sought and was granted enforcement 
of a nondisclosure agreement against Snepp, a former CIA intelligence 
officer, who “published a book about certain [agency] activities in South 
Vietnam” without first submitting it for prepublication review.129 In its 
opinion, the Court minimized the importance of the distinction between 
classified and nonclassified information, instead recognizing the “vital 
national interests” jeopardized when individuals fail to follow 
prepublication review protocols, which can “impai[r] the CIA’s ability to 
perform its statutory duties.”130 Since the Court was unwilling to challenge 
the CIA’s determination that even nonclassified information could be 
potentially damaging to the government’s security interests, it resolved the 
matter by pointing to Snepp’s breach of his trust relationship with the CIA 
and directed the proceeds of his book into government coffers.131  
 But it does not stop there. A year after Snepp, the Court affirmed its 
deference to the Executive when confronted with a case where covert 
intelligence interests butted up against free speech rights.132 In Haig v. 
Agee, the Court held the Secretary of State can lawfully revoke the passport 
of a U.S. citizen when that citizen’s speech imperils national security 
interests.133 Haig dealt with a disaffected CIA officer’s “campaign to 
expose CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive 
them out of the countries where they are operating.”134 The Secretary of 
State, provided with information about the officer’s activities, revoked his 
passport, justifying the revocation by pointing to the fact that his activities 
“[were] causing or [were] likely to cause serious damage to the national 
 
128 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
129 Id. at 507.  
130 Id. at 512.  
131 Id. at 511. The Court justified its determination that Snepp’s actions constituted a breach 
of trust by emphasizing his state of mind when deciding to forgo the prepublication review 
system, writing, “[Snepp] deliberately and surreptitiously violated his obligation to submit all 
material for prepublication review. Thus, he exposed classified information with which he had 
been entrusted to the risk of disclosure.” Id. at 511; cf. U.S. v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 
(4th Cir. 1972) (holding that, within the Fourth Circuit, “[the First Amendment] precludes 
[restraints on publicity] with respect to information which is unclassified or officially disclosed”).  
132 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
133 Id. at 309–10. 
134 Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted). The former CIA officer, Philip Agee, 
had his passport removed following a seven-year, worldwide effort to unmask covert 
CIA agents and informants, which led to “episodes of violence against the persons and 
organizations identified.” Id. at 285. 
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security or the foreign policy of the United States.”135 The revocation also 
contained a notice advising the passport holder of his right to a post-revocation 
hearing.136 The Court explained that, while the statute authorizing the 
government to issue passports did not explicitly contain provisions authorizing 
passport revocation, a combination of the “consistent administrative 
construction of that statute” to permit revocations and the uniquely 
compelling foreign policy and national interests at stake justified deference 
to the Secretary of State.137 The Court also held that the Department of 
State’s notice of passport revocation and offer of a post-revocation hearing 
met the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause.138 
 Haig was not without its critics. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice 
Marshall joined, dissented forcefully, worried that Haig’s First 
Amendment implications were deleterious to individual liberties.139 The 
dissenters took issue with the majority’s reasoning that Defendant’s 
critiques of the CIA weren’t entitled to constitutional protections.140 While 
they conceded that the facts of Haig were quite hard to overcome, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall nonetheless held firm in their belief that the content 
of the defendant’s speech was protected, however “unpopular” it might 
have been.141 While they pointed to administrative law rationales for why 
the Secretary of State might have overstepped his authority,142 they argued 
more persuasively that the precedent set by the Haig majority applied “not 
only to Philip Agee, whose activities could be perceived as harming the 
national security, but also to other citizens who may merely disagree with 
Government foreign policy and express their views.”143 
At first glance, it’s unlikely that members of the Trump 
Administration will successfully prevent current or former employees from 
disclosing nonclassified information so long as it does not trip the “sensitive 
information” wire in Snepp. There will certainly be edge cases where 
 
135 Id. at 286. 
136 Id. at 287. 
137 Id. at 290–92. 
138 Id. at 310. The Court observed that imposing an obligation on the Department of State to 
conduct a pre-revocation hearing when a “substantial likelihood” existed that defendants’ 
actions were causing “serious damage” to the national interest would effectively involve 
turning the Due Process Clause into a “suicide pact.” Id. at 309–10. 
139 Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
140 See id. at 308-09 (majority opinion) (“Agee’s disclosures, among other things, have 
the declared purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the recruiting of 
intelligence personnel. They are clearly not protected by the Constitution.”).  
141 Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
142 Id. at 317 (arguing that the “paucity of recorded administrative practice” with regard to 
passport revocations distinguished Haig from the precedential cases relied upon by the majority). 
143 Id. at 319. 
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information is plausibly related to national security and also plausibly 
mundane. Nevertheless, courts will not permit the President to deem all 
information shared with his employees as subject to national security secrecy 
provisions––especially since doing so might also come with efficiency losses 
as more and more information is subject to some form of classification. What 
Snepp and its progeny tell us, therefore, is that public employees seeking to avoid 
enforcement actions by the Trump White House would be well-advised to refrain 
from disseminating information closely related to the military, intelligence 
gathering, or national security, as it would substantially weaken their defense. 
Nonetheless, the Trump Administration does appear willing to contest 
the dissemination of supposedly unclassified information in violation of 
NDAs, as evidenced by legal action taken in Fall 2019. In November, for 
instance, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Division sought to halt 
publication of a book by an anonymous senior executive branch official144 
who previously drew President Trump’s ire for publishing an opinion piece 
in The New York Times.145 The DOJ asserted that, by publishing the book, the 
author “may violate [the] official’s legal obligations under one or more 
[NDAs].”146 The publishing house, Hachette, promptly refused to halt 
publication, defending their author and noting, “Hachette is not party to any 
nondisclosure agreements with the U.S. government that would require any 
prepublication review of this book, and Hachette routinely relies on its 
authors to comply with any contractual obligations they may have.”147 
Importantly, DOJ lawyers did not file suit against Hachette at the time––nor 
 
144 Letter from Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Carol F. Ross, 
Exec. Vice President, Hachette Book Grp., et al. (Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with author). For 
additional context, see John Mayer, Hachette, Warned by DOJ, Moving Ahead With “A 
Warning,” PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-
topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/81646-hachette-warned-by-doj-moving-ahead-
with-a-warning.html [https://perma.cc/GSZ2-GS9H].  
145 See Opinion, I Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-resis 
tance.html [https://perma.cc/79M2-HCF9] (describing the efforts of an organized group of 
administration officials to subvert President Trump’s “misguided impulses”).  
146 Letter from Joseph H. Hunt to Carol F. Ross et al., supra note 144, at 1. Recently, the 
President reassigned a political appointee from a national security role at the White House 
to the Department of Energy, leading some to comment that the individual may have been 
behind the anonymous opinion piece. Steve Holland, Trump’s Deputy National Security Adviser 
Victoria Coates Leaving White House, Reuters (Feb. 20, 2020, 10:07 AM), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-coates/trumps-deputy-national-security-adviser-victoria-coates 
-leaving-white-house-idUSKBN20E24R [https://perma.cc/7YK2-GXSW]. 
147 Letter from Carol F. Ross, Exec. Vice President, Hachette Book Grp., to Joseph H. Hunt, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with author).  
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have they as this Comment goes to print.148 Whether the decision to refrain 
from doing so reflects an awareness of the potentially dubious strength of the 
Department’s legal claims remains to be seen. What is clear is that, as NDAs 
and nondisparagement agreements continue to make news,149 the stakes of 
these legal dramas become higher and higher.  
 
3. An Objection––When Parties Waive Their Constitutional Rights  
 
The Trump Administration nevertheless has strong counterarguments 
to raise against any current or former employee seeking to expose 
information the President would prefer to remain secret. In this Subsection, I 
will focus my attention on the strongest such argument: that the employees 
in question signed away their First Amendment rights and that doing so was 
entirely lawful. Current and former employees have reason to pause and 
carefully consider the likelihood of the Administration prevailing on this 
claim. After all, while waiver sounds in constitutional law, it draws its 
inspiration from contract law principles––namely, that courts ought to trust 
parties’ stated intentions as memorialized in duly enacted written agreements. 
That the legal landscape surrounding the waiver of constitutional rights, 
specifically First Amendment rights, is difficult to parse only increases the 
likelihood that the Administration could persuade courts to adopt this easily 
applicable contract law approach. In this Subsection, I will chart the benefits 
and drawbacks of permitting individuals to waive their constitutional rights and 
explain how plaintiffs might respond to the arguments contemplated above. 
 
148 Cf. Complaint, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:19-cv-01197 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2019) 
(initiating a civil breach of contract suit against Edward Snowden in response to his publication 
of a book without submitting the manuscript for prepublication review by the U.S. government 
as allegedly required by employment contracts he signed earlier in his career).  
149 To reference just one recent example, in October 2019, President Trump announced he 
intended to host the G-7 Summit at one of his Florida properties, only to face immediate 
criticism from ethics watchdogs. Courtney Bublé, Ethics Officials Criticize Selection of 
Trump Resort for G-7 Summit, GOV. EXEC. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/ 
oversight/2019/10/ethics-officials-criticize-selection-trump-resort-g-7-summit/160703/ 
[https://perma.cc/FG4K-XH4S]. Of particular concern was the fact that, should “the Trump 
Organization becom[e] a government contractor, federal law could force the company to 
loosen its nondisclosure agreements.” Walter Shaub, Doral Hosting the G-7 Could 
Jeopardize Trump’s Nondisclosure Agreement, CREW (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.citizens 
forethics.org/doral-g7-jeopardize-trumps-nondisclosure-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/7PSB-
83 FZ]. Several days after the decision was first announced, however, the White House 
“abruptly reversed course,” saying the summit would be held elsewhere. Katie Sullivan, 
Trump Reserves Course and Says His Florida Resort Won’t Be Used for G7 Summit, CNN 
(Oct. 20, 2019, 1:13 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/19/politics/trump-property-no-
longer-considered-for-g7-summit/index.html [https://perma.cc/7KZE-YRGM]. 
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 On its face, waiving constitutional rights is not always problematic. On 
the one hand, courts must allow parties to waive constitutional rights to ensure 
the continued functioning of our judicial system, particularly in criminal 
cases.150 “Constitutional rights are waived every day. People incriminate 
themselves, surrender their rights to counsel, waive a bundle of rights as part of 
plea bargains, and sign contracts surrendering a right to trial through arbitration 
or confession of judgment clauses.”151 These efficiency gains are critically 
important, especially against the backdrop of a federal judiciary struggling under 
the burden of increasing filings. Plus, they save parties money: “[i]n terms of 
monetary costs, waivers allow people to reach informal agreements that avoid 
the expense of asserting their rights.”152 Lastly, “waivers frequently save time” 
by allowing parties to quickly resolve their disputes153 
 On the other hand, waivers can be dangerous. “Waivers can be 
dangerous for precisely the same reason that they can be valuable: they 
constitute alternatives to the protections provided by the plenary assertion of 
one’s rights.”154 Allowing individuals to “waive” their rights only makes 
sense when they do so consciously155––and even then, certain rights are 
beyond the scope of the doctrine (e.g., the right to waive one’s Thirteenth 
Amendment rights).156 Indeed, there is a collective sense that courts should 
more closely police the waiver of the core rights vested in each of us.157 But 
even there, courts can get it wrong; by focusing their waiver analyses on the 
individual parties to an agreement—devoid of a broader context—they may 
fail to see the whole field, potentially permitting waiver in exactly those 
instances where individuals stand to lose the most.158 Plus, waiver of First 
 
150 See, e.g., Michael E. Tigar, Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the 
Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1970) (“It is waiver of rights that permits the system of 
criminal justice to work at all.”). 
151 Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the 
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 346.  
152 Rubin, supra note 19, at 488. 
153 Id.  
154 Id. 
155 Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive 
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1383 (1984) (“A doctrine respecting individual choices, 
however, requires that such choices should at least result from conscious choice.”). 
156 But, for some, refusing to allow waiver of 13th or 14th Amendment rights also raises the 
specter of paternalism. “There seems to be substantial support from both sides of the aisle 
for the view that the attempts to choose for another what that person ‘really wants’ in the 
name of freedom has a tendency to degenerate into totalitarianism.” Id. at 1388 n.346. 
157 See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (explaining that, when a 
“fundamental” right is at issue, “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver”). 
158 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 19, at 529 (“[A] theory of waiver should take account of the entire 
situation in which the waiver occurs. This is something that current rationales, by considering 
only the waiving party and ignoring the other participants in the transaction, fail to do.”). 
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Amendment rights is arguably distinguishable from waiver of constitutional 
rights in criminal proceedings. When you waive your right to a jury, you have 
a clear sense of what you’re giving up; when you waive future rights of free 
expression, you don’t yet know what opportunities you are trading away. This 
begs the question: is the waiver of constitutional rights appropriate in the 
context of President Trump’s contracts for silence? 
At first blush, it would seem plaintiffs have little leeway due to the 
enforcement-friendly waiver, especially since the Court has never had occasion to 
announce a legal standard for when individuals can waive their First Amendment 
rights.159 In the absence of controlling precedent, circuit courts have generally 
mapped traditional waiver of constitutional rights standards onto the First 
Amendment.160 The Ninth Circuit, for instance, “has established that contracts [for 
silence] can evidence knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver because parties 
have the ability to exchange rights in the bargaining process.”161 On the margins, 
courts might also consider mitigating factors like whether the agreement was 
“reached through fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.”162 They may also consider the 
relative strength of the parties involved, especially their financial resources.163 The 
fact remains, however, that arguing about these factors is unlikely to vindicate 
the rights of the plaintiffs my Comment contemplates.  
But much as the public policy doctrine sets the outer limits of the 
freedom of contract, the doctrine of alienability polices the appropriate use 
of constitutional waivers. While there are reasons to accept individuals’ 
conscious decisions to waive constitutional rights in certain instances, we 
might also worry about the aggregate effect of such decisions over time, 
particularly in the context of contracts for silence.164 For instance, arguably 
there are certain rights which are not an individual’s to waive. This is how 
we reach alienability. A right is waivable, or alienable, when “the power not 
 
159 Brittany Scott, Note, Waiving Goodbye to First Amendment Protections: First 
Amendment Waiver by Contract, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451, 451 (2019).  
160 Id. at 455.  
161 Id. at 459; see also Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 685 Fed. App’x 623, 
626 (9th Cir. 2017); accord Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1993). 
162 Rubin, supra note 19, at 513. 
163 As Rubin explains, 
Where the party agreeing to the waiver is equal in economic strength to 
the other party, has openly discussed the waiver term, and has obtained 
some advantage in return for his agreement, the waiver will generally be 
enforced, where any of these conditions is absent, however, the waiver will 
be carefully scrutinized. 
Id. at 523.  
164 See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 155, at 1391 (“Most importantly, the government may be 
barred from attempting to obtain waivers of constitutional rights because such attempts may 
constitute an unacceptable accumulation of power over the right in question.”). 
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to exercise the right [is] transferable to another party in exchange for the 
proffered benefit.”165 A right would be inalienable, however, when it was not 
possible for an individual to transfer their interest. The best argument in 
defense of the plaintiffs I contemplate would therefore be to emphasize the 
inalienability of their speech rights. They might argue, for instance, that 
allowing individuals to sell off their ability to speak on matters of public 
concern undermines our core democratic values––and that even if individuals 
can sign away their free speech rights to other private parties, purchasing 
citizen speech should always be off limits to the State.166 
 
B. Defenses Available to Former Private Sector Employees of the President  
 
The argument that the President, by virtue of his current public office, 
should be restrained from enforcing contracts for silence against previous 
private-sector or campaign employees is harder to make out—no matter how 
you cut it.167 On one hand, the above principles of democratic accountability 
counsel that the State should not be permitted to chill citizen speech on 
matters of public concern, especially when that information is not necessary 
to safeguard national security. On the other hand, these individuals willingly 
limited their free speech rights via contract before they knew the other party 
to their agreement would become President of the United States. In this 
Section, I explore the unique policy arguments for and against blocking the 
President’s enforcement actions against such employees, while attempting to 
locate the strongest possible defenses available to such plaintiffs who square 
off against the President. 
 The best arguments in favor of forbidding enforcement actions by the 
President against former private-sector employees are grounded in democratic 
theory and in novel attempts to reconceptualize First Amendment 
 
165 Id. at 1386. 
166 Id. at 1391. 
167 For instance, a former campaign staffer named Jessica Denson has tried unsuccessfully to 
escape the arbitration clause in an NDA she signed with the Trump Campaign in her capacity 
as an employee. Denson “sued in federal court to void her NDA in order to pursue a separate 
state lawsuit in which she claim[ed] she was harassed and defamed by her superiors.” Bob 
Van Voris, Former Trump Campaign Staffer Loses Case Over Nondisclosure, BLOOMBERG 
(July 23, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-23/former-
trump-campaign-staffer-loses-case-over-non-disclosure [https://perma.cc/NRX4-FUVC]. She 
lost in federal court, where S.D.N.Y. Judge Jesse M. Furman sent her dispute to arbitration. 
Id.; Denson v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., No. 18-cv-2690, 2018 WL 4568430 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018). The arbiter subsequently awarded the Trump Campaign tens of 
thousands of dollars in fees. Van Voris, supra. Denson also tried unsuccessfully to vacate that 
arbitral award against her in a later state court case. Denson v. Donald J. Trump for President, 
Inc., No. 0101616/2017, 2019 NYLJ LEXIS 958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 2019). 
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jurisprudence. Scholarship by democratic theorists supports the proposition 
that secrecy undermines trust, transparency, and faith in government––
particularly when that secrecy is engaged in conspiratorially and with the 
express purpose of hiding wrongdoing from view.168 Commitments like these 
to government accountability are no longer outliers; international norms now 
reflect the idea that “[o]penness and transparency are key ingredients to build 
accountability and trust, which are necessary for the functioning of democracies 
and market economies.”169 So long as Americans tolerate state actors using 
contracts for silence to manipulate the scope of public debate––and oftentimes 
to chill the speech of the individuals best positioned to steer that debate––we 
are complicit in the corruption of those norms.  
By inhibiting the free flow of information, government-enforced 
secrecy places constraints on “speech concerning public affairs,” which is 
itself “more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”170 
Indeed, “[a]t the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each 
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of 
expression, consideration, and adherence.”171 Self-actualization through 
speech, debate, and engagement with the government is core to the American 
ideal and sustains our democratic project; it ensures “the unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.”172 In short, plaintiffs could potentially contend that 
contracts for silence undermine the Framers’ vision for free and open debate 
by making it harder or impossible for them to hold their former employer, 
now-President Trump, accountable.173 
 
168 BENTHAM, supra note 89; see also Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S 
WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10, 10 (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social 
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
most efficient policeman.”).  
169 Angel Gurria, Openness and Transparency––Pillars for Democracy, Trust, and Progress, 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/fr/etatsunis/opennessandtransparency-pillarsfordemocracytrustand 
progress.htm [https://perma.cc/QEH7-M75J] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
170 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citation omitted).  
171 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).  
172 Connick, 461 U.S. at 145 (citation omitted). 
173 As Justice Brandeis wrote in his dissent in Olmstead,  
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's 
spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material 
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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 An alternative approach for these plaintiffs would be to explain that 
the free exchange of ideas facilitated by the First Amendment “furthers 
intrinsic and instrumental values for speakers and listeners,” with a distinct 
emphasis on the latter.174 A recent champion of this position is Burt 
Neuborne, former Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union. He 
has publicly advocated for such a position by arguing that courts ought to 
shift the focus of First Amendment scholarship away from the unquestioned 
primacy of the “speaker” and towards a “hearer”-centric model, especially in 
the context of contracts for silence.175 Neuborne’s thesis is that “asserting a 
hearer’s ‘right to know’ as the counterweight to promises she hasn’t 
consented to may be the only plausible route to attacking NDAs . . . under 
federal law as violations of the First Amendment.”176 Since “[t]he Court has 
recognized that respecting a hearer’s First Amendment interest in receiving 
information can pry important information out of unwilling speakers”––
especially in the context of FOIA or consumer protection suits––adopting a 
hearer-centered approach to First Amendment advocacy might allow the Court 
to reach the sorts of edge cases like those contemplated in this section.177  
Neuborne is not alone in this position. David Cole has similarly 
argued for a hearer-centered approach to First Amendment jurisprudence, 
writing, “[w]hen the government funds speech . . . First Amendment concerns 
are not limited to potential coercion of the subsidized speaker.”178 Instead, 
they “extend also, and perhaps more importantly, to the listener. From the 
perspective of the audience, the danger lies not in the coercive effect of the 
benefit on speaker, but in the indoctrinating effect of a monopolized 
marketplace of ideas.”179 Applying Neuborne’s hypothesis to the genre of 
lawsuit contemplated here would require plaintiffs to describe in great detail 
the public’s interest in whatever information they wanted to reveal. To be 
successful, such disclosure would likely need to add important evidence to 
an ongoing public debate of the highest order. 
 Of course, an argument like Neuborne’s is not likely to suddenly carry 
the day. Additional research and factfinding would be required for it to take 
hold. In fact, recent caselaw suggests that the Court may be particularly 
averse to blocking NDA enforcement actions when the individuals seeking 
to disclose information only gained access to that information subsequent to 
 
174 Johnson v. Fed. Express Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (emphasis added).  
175 Neuborne, supra note 3, at 413. 
176 Id. at 438. 
177 Id. at 414. 
178 David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Chartering Spheres of Neutrality in 
Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680 (1992).  
179 Id.  
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signing away their right to disclose it; such circumstances create “a powerful 
equitable basis . . . for enforcing the promise as a form of reliance,” as 
compared to a situation where an individual had access to certain information, 
signed an NDA, and then wanted to share that information so as to prevent 
third-party harm.180 For these reasons, I find it hard to believe the courts 
would endorse such a novel approach to the First Amendment––at least while 
litigation stemming from Trump campaign malfeasance remains live. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
NDAs and nondisparagement agreements are now common features of 
our contracting landscape. Their increased use by state actors, however, presents 
new challenges to safeguarding our core democratic values. In the absence of 
legislative action,181 the task of controlling the spread of contracts for silence by 
elected officials, like the President, falls to litigants. In this Article, I have 
provided hypothetical plaintiffs a roadmap as they aim to hold accountable 
elected officials who would use contracts for silence to chill the speech of those 
they have sworn to serve.  
 
 
 
180 See Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991) (permitting recovery under a 
promissory estoppel theory for a confidential source who, after having shared information 
with a newspaper on the condition of anonymity, had his identity revealed in breach of 
contract). Neuborne has suggested this distinction as “a basis for distinguishing Snepp and 
Cowles Media from situations like Stormy Daniels’s NDA, where her possession of the 
information she wishes to disseminate has nothing to do with her promise not to speak.” 
Neuborne, supra note 3, at 433. 
181 Cf. NDAs: New Laws to Crack Down on ‘Gagging’ Clauses, BBC (July 21, 2019), https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/uk-49060456 [https://perma.cc/JH7R-WVK2] (describing legislative 
proposals in the United Kingdom which would “ban NDAs that stop people disclosing 
information to the police, doctors, or lawyers”).  
